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Pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), an employer may not discriminate against an employee on the basis of a disability with respect to most aspects of employment, including the provision of fringe benefits. In order to have standing to bring suit under Title I of the ADA (Title I), a plaintiff must be a “qualified individual” with a disability. In McKnight v. General Motors Corp., the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., whether disabled former employees have standing to bring suit under Title I “against their former employers for discrimination with respect to the payment of post-employment fringe benefits.” The Sixth Circuit held that Title I unambiguously excludes former disabled employees and denied standing to the plaintiffs. . .
Federal common law governs claims arising out of employee benefit plans covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit created an approach for interpreting the ambiguous word “accident” in ERISA-governed plans in Wickman v. Northwestern National Insurance Co. In Stamp v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the First Circuit used the Wickman framework to address, for the first time, whether the administrator of an ERISA-governed plan could reasonably conclude that the death of an insured party who was killed in a single-car accident when driving drunk was not accidental for purposes of his life insurance policies. The First Circuit reviewed the administrator’s decision under an arbitrary and capricious standard and upheld the decision as both reasonable and supported by the evidence on the record. . . .
An Immigration Judge (IJ) or the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) will commonly deny an application for asylum in the United States as a result of an adverse credibility determination. Appellate Courts give adverse credibility determinations great deference on appeal if the IJ gave specific reasons justifying the finding. In Cuko v. Mukasey, the First Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether an adverse credibility determination based on perceived inconsistencies in testimony and the applicant’s demeanor should be upheld under this deferential standard of review. The First Circuit, applying the substantial evidence standard, denied the petition for review because the record did not compel a decision contrary to that of the IJ and BIA. . . .