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The Kaitlyn Keaney Fund is hosting a raffle fundraiser to support the nephew of a Suffolk Law Review alumus. Devin Suau, a six year old boy from Framingham, MA, was diagnosed with Diffuse Intrinsic Pontine Glioma (DIPG) in January 2017. DIPG is a form of pediatric brain cancer that affects 200-300 children ages 5-9 per year in the U.S. DIPG has a 0% survival rate with no known effective treatments and an average survival after diagnosis of just 9 months.
Devin’s family believes someone has to be the first to beat this, so why not Devin? Unfortunately, insurance only covers initial radiation, and there is almost zero federal funding. Experimental clinical trials can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Raffle tickets are $20 each with no limit to the number of tickets you can purchase. The drawing will be held at Florian Hall in Dorchester on May 6. You do not need to be present to win.
The prizes are:
1st Prize: 3 Days/3 Nights at Las Vegas MGM – AIRFARE INCLUDED
2nd Prize: 2 Night stay at Fischer Island in Miami, Florida. Luxury, private 3 bedroom that includes a $500 Delta voucher for flights.
3rd Prize: Dinner for 6 at Del Frisco’s Steakhouse located in the Seaport District. Wine Included
4th Prize: Set of Calloway Golf Irons
5th Prize: 4 Green Monster Seats to any Red Sox game during the year
Raffle tickets may be purchased by visiting https://www.youcaring.com/thesuaufamily-787726
Contrary to its trade name, recent litigation involving Blue Diamond almond milk has been far from a breeze. Massachusetts resident Casley Vass, on behalf of himself and similarly situated plaintiffs, brought suit against one of the nation’s leading almond milk producers, Blue Diamond Growers (Blue Diamond), claiming that the labeling of Almond Breeze almond milk was deceptive. The case is instructive as to the extent of cognizable economic injury under Massachusetts’s consumer protection law, Chapter 93A.
In Vass v. Blue Diamond Growers, the plaintiff alleged inter alia that almond milk labeled as “all natural” was misleading as it actually contained several artificial ingredients. The plaintiff averred that he purchased this “all natural” product relying on its label, and was deceived into thinking it was in fact an entirely “natural” product. As a result, the plaintiff and similarly situated consumers across the country alleged they were injured by purchasing the defendant’s product. (more…)
On December 22, 2015, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Court) ruled in G.S.B. v. Switzerland that the disclosure of banking information from Switzerland to the United States, based on a bilateral agreement, did not amount to a violation of Article 8 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or the Convention), which provides for the right to respect for private life. This piece will include a short introduction to the ECHR and the ECtHR, a summarization of the facts and legal claims involved in G.S.B. v. Switzerland, a description of the Court’s main legal reasoning supporting its holding, and some concluding thoughts on the potential impact of the judgment on international income taxation, bilateral tax agreements, and extraterritorial jurisdiction. The holding in this case is a step in the right direction with respect to increasing transparency between the U.S. and Swiss tax systems, and raises important considerations regarding balancing of individual privacy rights with states’ broader economic rights. (more…)
The reputation of private prisons has taken a beating during the last few years. Undercover reporting in private prisons has revealed horrifying conditions and violence. Scholars have largely turned against private prisons, supporting their opposition on both philosophical and practical grounds. Further, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced in August 2016 that it would phase out the use of private prisons. However, few alternatives to private prisons have been proposed. This Article proposes an alternative: charter prisons, run through public-private partnerships, which will be capable of providing more services to prisoners without increasing the cost to taxpayers. (more…)
The Honorable Frank M. Gaziano, JD ’89
Associate Justice, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Thursday, April 20, 2017
Omni Parker House
60 School Street, Boston
Alumni: $75; 2012-16 graduates and alumni in public service: $50; students: $25
To RSVP, visit attend.com/SULawRevidw50 or
contact Annamaria Mueller at firstname.lastname@example.org or 617-305-1999.
The interpretation and application of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) has challenged federal courts for the last two decades in the twentieth century. The ATS, a single sentence within the Judiciary Act of 1789, provides United States federal courts with original jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” Following a lengthy dormant period, federal courts resurrected the ATS in the 1980s to grant federal jurisdiction over international human rights claims where both the plaintiff and defendant are of foreign origin. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, however, courts have struggled to find a consistent approach to adjudicating claims brought against multinational corporate defendants. As ATS jurisprudence has evolved, courts have largely narrowed its application, reducing foreign plaintiffs’ abilities to have their claims adjudicated in American federal courts.
This Note will trace the history of the modern use of the ATS with a focus towards the development of its use against multinational corporations. It will discuss the difficulty courts have faced in limiting the ATS to specific torts, as well as the difficulties courts have faced in applying the ATS in response to the restrictive territorial test outlined in Kiobel. This Note will also argue that a broad and inclusive “touch-and-concern” test to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality creates more problems than it solves. Instead, this Note suggests that such boundaries are best determined by new legislation aimed specifically at the modern day, multinational corporations.
Congress continually adjusts copyright law to correspond with the advent of new technologies, such as the World Wide Web. Through copyright law, Congress aims to incentivize authors to create and disseminate new works without stifling their creativity by providing copyright holders with too much protection. The United States Constitution states copyright protection’s goal: “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Determining the scope of copyright protection, however, is difficult; some authors want perpetual monopolies in their works while others are willing to allow free access to their works after recouping their initial investment.
Because current protections for digital image copyright owners leave creators and content providers vulnerable to mass infringement, legislative action is required to prevent further copyright transgressions and to ensure creative output thrives. Furthermore, copyright owners like Getty may be able to better protect their online content if digital images became copyright protected under Title 17 of the United States Code. This Note argues that the historical practice of safeguarding authors and publishers, coupled with compelling policy concerns, provide ample justification for extending sui generis copyright protection to digital images.
In a widely fractured decision, the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation was not violated when an expert provided testimony concerning a DNA profile linking the defendant to his accused crime. In Williams v. Illinois, the Court articulated three different reasons as to why the expert testimony, in the absence of testimony from the primary analyst, did not violate the Confrontation Clause. The plurality decision in Williams produced significant inconsistencies among courts analyzing the issue of expert testimony and defendants’ right to confront their accusers.
This Note will begin by explaining defendants’ right to confrontation and discussing the evolution of the Confrontation Clause through Crawford, Williams, and other seminal cases. The Note will then discuss the lack of uniformity in Confrontation Clause analyses across the country due to the fractured Williams decision. Next, it will examine the unreliability of crime labs and forensic evidence by illustrating crime lab scandals occurring in multiple states. The analysis argues that states should reject the Williams notion of inherent DNA testing reliability, and provide defendants with better protection by requiring the primary analyst to testify to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.
Congress enacted the Lanham Act for two primary reasons: ensuring public confidence that a product is genuine, and preventing misappropriation of that product’s identifiers by “pirates and cheats.”1 Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act prevents federal registration of scandalous, immoral, or disparaging trademarks.2 In In re Tam,3 the Federal Circuit reviewed en banc whether the First Amendment allows the denial of a trademark application that the Trademark Examiner and Trademark Trial and Appeals Board (TTAB) found disparaging.4 Vacating the TTAB’s holding, the Federal Circuit held that the “disparaging” provision of section 2(a) of the Lanham Act violates the First Amendment right to free speech because the government has no legitimate interest in denying registration under the provision.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd- Frank Act) reformed federal financial regulation in response to the Great Recession. The Dodd-Frank Act includes incentives and protections for whistleblowers who report violations of federal securities laws. In Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered whether the anti-retaliation provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act protect a whistleblower who does not report violations to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The court held that the statute is sufficiently ambiguous so as to warrant deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resource Defense Council, Inc. to SEC regulations, which extend protection to internal whistleblowers who merely report violations within their organization. The court’s decision split from the Fifth Circuit—the only other circuit court of appeals that has addressed this issue and deemed that the statute unambiguously required whistleblowers to report to the SEC.