On November 17, 1603, at the conclusion of Sir Walter Raleigh’s now famous trial, a jury found Raleigh guilty of treason. Historical observers have recognized the unfairness of the entire proceeding, but it was the denial of Raleigh’s request to face his lone accuser that arguably brought the trial its notoriety. The prosecution based its case almost entirely upon the assertions of Raleigh’s alleged accomplice, Lord Cobham, who never testified at the trial. Raleigh argued that Cobham lied in order to clear his own name and pleaded with the court to allow him to face his accuser: “[t]he Proof of the Common Law is by witness and jury: let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my accuser before my face . . . .” The court refused his request and held that it would not consider the issue of confrontation in a case of treason against the King. Ultimately, the jury found Raleigh guilty and sentenced him to death.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” Through the years, the Supreme Court has noted that the Confrontation Clause serves several different purposes. Undoubtedly, its most important purpose is that which guarantees an accused the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses in a criminal proceeding. The Court affirmed this in Crawford v. Washington by holding that testimonial statements admitted under a hearsay exception violate the accused’s confrontation rights unless the declarant is unavailable and the accused had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. . . .