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Federal appellate courts employ particular rules to address certain trial defects known as ”plain errors.” Section 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a codification of old statutory and common law, governs modern day plain error appeals. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted and redefined Rule 52(b) to provide methods of analysis that resolve plain error appeals. The Court, however, has left some aspects of this analysis unsettled within the circuit courts. . . .
This Note will discuss the need for the Supreme Court to revisit the confidentiality issue, and more importantly, the need for a determination that individuals hold a privacy interest in personal, identifiable health and medical information. First, this Note will define ”medical records” and delineate when their nonconsensual disclosure implicates privacy interests of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Second, this Note will trace the origins of the right to privacy and the Supreme Court’s recognition of this right despite the lack of an express guarantee in the U.S. Constitution. Finally, this Note will recommend the implementation of a more stringent standard of review in the area of medical records and personal health information to safeguard privacy interests against unwarranted government intrusion. . . .
Space law is a complex mixture of international and domestic laws that govern a wide spectrum of activities. Such activities can range from the exotic, like creating the institutional framework for an international lunar mining consortium, to the more routine, like drafting telecommunications agreements. The fields of law these activities can involve include administrative law, intellectual property law, arms control law, insurance law, environmental law, criminal law, and commercial law, as well as international treaties and domestic legislation written specifically for space. This paper outlines the origin and scope of space law and addresses the emerging challenges that this body of law faces in the 21st Century. . . .
For more information about Professor Gabrynowicz’s Donahue Lecture (which served as the basis for this article) please click here.
The early American jury system empanelled individuals whose identities were known by the community. Indeed, in most situations each juror was familiar with the accused, allowing defendants to hold jurors accountable for the decisions they made behind closed doors. The functional importance of an identifiable jury is as essential today as it was in early colonial society, for it ensures that judgment is rendered by members of the community who are ultimately accountable to the accused. The practical rationale for keeping the names of jurors public is supported by the First Amendment, which guarantees open access to the administration of justice. Proponents of extending the First Amendment to the names of jurors rely, in part, on historical precedent: since the inception of the jury system, the names of jurors have been accessible to the public. The historical convention makes sense from a public policy standpoint, for by allowing the public to verify the composition of the jury, the court promotes the appearance of justice, provides an outlet for community emotion and hostility, and educates the public as to the administration of judicial proceedings. . . .
It is an honor to be asked to this school, especially to give one of the Donahue Lectures. Professor Anthony Polito, a friend for whom I have been a guest teacher, suggested my name in part to introduce this series to taxation. Constitutional law, the usual fare, finds a more preconditioned audience. But that may be because—as a professor who taught me both subjects said—”A lot of people know or think they know a great deal about the Constitution, though they couldnt quote you one sentence of it.
By contrast, most people think they know nothing about tax, although it informs their lives. Tax influences your choice of renting or buying a home, selling or keeping stocks, how to save for retirement. On a professional level, understanding the way that tax looks at the world—the concepts in which it thinks—shows you how to analyze a transaction no matter what rules apply….
For more information about Mr. Kingson’s Donahue Lecture (which served as the basis for this article) please click here.
“Each state as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate concern in the marital status of persons domiciled within its borders.” The authority of the state to regulate the marriage contract is certain, unrestricted even by the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution. In recent years, courts have reconsidered the marriage contract in the context of same-sex relationships, considering if and how the rights and obligations of the marital institution apply to same-sex unions. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court confronted the issue in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, asking whether the state, through an exercise of its police powers, may bar same-sex couples from marriage. In a 4-3 decision, the Court held that failing to provide the protections, benefits, and obligations of marriage to same-sex couples violates the Massachusetts Constitution. . . .
This symposium on the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) is dedicated to Martin I. Lubaroff, whose untimely death on January 1, 2001 after a year-long battle with leukemia was a great loss to the legal profession and especially to the many colleagues who worked closely with him on legislative drafting projects involving limited partnerships and other alternative business entities. A graduate of Harvard Law School, Marty, as he was called by everyone who knew him, joined the prominent Wilmington, Delaware law firm of Richards, Layton & Finger in 1966, became a partner in the firm in 1971, and at the time of his death was a senior partner and chair of the firm’s robust and highly respected alternative entity practice. . . .
”Linkage” of the law governing general partnerships to the law governing limited partnerships has received a good deal of attention in the last few years. The concept of filling the gaps in limited partnership law with the general partnership law, or ”linkage,” is embodied in provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 (UPA), the Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1916 (ULPA), and the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1976 (RULPA). The promulgation of the revised Uniform Partnership Act in 1994 (RUPA) unsettled this long-standing tradition, as the drafters of RUPA made significant changes in the general partnership context and declined to address linkage in the Act. How well linkage of limited partnership law to the UPA has worked historically would be the subject of some debate. There is less disagreement between the two most vocal commentators in this area with regard to the results of linking limited partnership law to RUPA. Professor Ribstein states that linking RUPA to the limited partnership statutes will create ”possible interpretation problems,” and Dean Vestal predicts ”chaos.” Indeed, RUPA has been the catalyst for the recent thoughtful commentary in this area, and it certainly appears to have exacerbated the problems and uncertainties associated with the linkage of general and limited partnership law. . . .
The “shelf life” on uniform entity acts seems to be decreasing. The original Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) lasted eight decades, and the original Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA (1916)) lasted six. In contrast, the 1976 Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA (1976)) warranted major revisions after just nine years (RULPA (1985)),2 and only sixteen years later NCCUSL recommended to the states that they adopt ULPA (2001) to replace RULPA in toto. NCCUSL’s Revised Uniform [General] Partnership Act—RUPA—was first approved in 1992 and went through five official versions in its first five years of existence. NCCUSL’s Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) was substantially amended just one year after its initial adoption, is less than a decade old, and is already subject to a NCCUSL drafting project that will propose a second generation, replacement LLC act.
The rapidity of change is not limited to unincorporated entities or to uniform acts. In the past twenty years, the ABA Corporate Law Committee has made numerous major revisions to the Model Business Corporations Act, addressing inter alia: distributions, conflict of interest transactions, limitation on director liability, derivative proceedings, closely held corporations, shareholder meetings and voting, standards of conduct and liability for directors, standards of conduct for officers, appraisal rights, fundamental changes, and domestication and conversion. . . .
The heart and soul of limited partnership law is that general partners are personally liable for partnership obligations but limited partners are not. Protecting limited partners from personal responsibility has not been as easy as this simple mission would suggest. The central focus of every promulgated uniform limited partnership act since 1916 has been to fortify the limited partner liability shield and make it more impervious to assault. So it was with the Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1916 (ULPA 1916), the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1976 (RULPA 1976), and the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1985 (RULPA 1985). While each promulgated act attempted to strengthen the limited partner liability shield, various statutory expressions were retained to protect creditors who dealt with the limited partnership reasonably believing a limited partner was a general partner. . . .