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In the wake of the IGRA, Indian gaming has expanded exponentially due to its ability to jumpstart economic development on reservations and its potential for immense financial success. In Massachusetts, because casino gambling is currently illegal, no Indian tribes operate gaming facilities. Before the federal government legally recognized the Mashpee Wampanoag, a Massachusetts tribe, the tribe expressed interest in pursuing casino gaming. Upon receiving federal recognition, the Mashpee quickly negotiated an intergovernmental agreement with the Town of Middleborough to build a destination-resort casino. Another Massachusetts tribe, the Aquinnah Wampanoag, have also actively pursued their own gaming facility.
Per the IGRA’s requirements, Massachusetts must legalize casino gaming before any tribe can open a casino through the federal process. Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick supports casino gaming in the Commonwealth and has proposed legislation to place three commercial casino licenses up for bid. Patrick’s proposed legislation reserves at least one of the licensed casinos for a tribe. As a result, casino gambling and Indian gaming may come to Massachusetts; however, it is unclear whether the Mashpee or the Aquinnah will bid on a state license or, alternatively, continue with the federal application process. Ultimately, the Massachusetts legislature must consider whether to legalize casino-style gaming in the form of tribal casinos or commercial casinos, while remaining cognizant that a federally recognized tribe may establish any gaming operation permitted under Massachusetts law.
Part II of this Note will examine the legal relationship between the federal government and American Indians in the historical context of Indian gaming. Further, this Note will recount Massachusetts’s gaming history, culminating in the recent state and tribal efforts to establish casino gaming. In light of developments in other states, Part III will anticipate the different forms that Indian gaming and commercial gaming may take in Massachusetts. Finally, this Note will assess the goals of the IGRA as they pertain to Massachusetts’s potential gaming developments and also predict which scenario represents the most effective compromise between the tribes and Commonwealth. . . .
This Note will begin by outlining the historic expansion of civil-rights protection in Massachusetts within the employment context. It will then address the increased concern regarding weight discrimination and how existing Massachusetts law fails to provide an adequate avenue for bringing weight-discrimination claims. Moreover, it will examine existing laws in other United States jurisdictions that have addressed similar issues and employ these jurisdictions as tools for comparison in addressing criticism of the pending Massachusetts legislation. Finally, this Note will suggest ways to increase the legislation’s probability of enactment and success.
The Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) funds a national system of old age, survivors, disability, and hospital insurance, commonly known as social security and Medicare. To achieve its purpose, FICA imposes a tax on both employers and employees at a level corresponding to a percentage of the employee’s wages. In University of Pittsburgh v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered whether the payments of the University of Pittsburgh (University) pursuant to an early retirement plan (ERP) for its tenured professors constitute taxable “wages” under FICA. The Third Circuit held that FICA taxation applies to ERPs because such benefits are compensation for services and thus constitute wages.
This Note will use the Hamilton Farm incident in Winchester, Massachusetts, to discuss the effects and inefficacy of Chapter 40B.30 Part II, sections A and B, will first explore the history, usage, and contours of Chapter 40B. Part II, sections C and D, will then address the law as applied to Winchester, Massachusetts, including the motivations behind Winchester’s resistance to the proposed development of Hamilton Farm and the scheme Winchester took to avoid the law. Next, section D will introduce the Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 40R (Chapter 40R) Smart Growth Zoning and Housing Production law as an alternative to Chapter 40B. Part III will argue that Chapter 40B was, indeed, successful in motivating Winchester residents to implement more inclusive zoning laws, even though the law was not able to create affordable housing in this instance. Finally, this Note will conclude that Chapter 40B is not the most efficient means to achieve Massachusetts’s affordable housing goals despite the legislature’s admirable intentions.
This Note begins by explaining the origins and objectives of patent law and copyright law. It then presents the substantive requirements of patent infringement, willful patent infringement, and the structure of patent infringement damages. In parallel, this Note presents the substantive requirements of copyright infringement, willful copyright infringement, and the structure of copyright-infringement damages. It then analyzes the relevant differences between the two bodies of law and considers whether these differences should affect the meaning assigned to “willfulness,” and thus the availability of enhanced damages to prevailing plaintiffs.’ The analysis focuses on whether an “objective recklessness” standard for willfulness in patent law allows for an adequate remedy that preserves the incentive to patent inventions and effectively deters patent infringement. Finally, this Note concludes that in deciding to import a standard from copyright law into patent law, courts should consider the contrasting policies and statutory structures underlying patent and copyright protection.’ Copyright law’s objective recklessness standard may not be appropriate in patent law because it can preclude patentees from recovering full compensation for infringement and it contributes to the underdeterrence of patent infringement. . . .
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution affords individuals the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The United States Supreme Court recognizes that certain seizures, such as investigatory stops conducted by police officers, comport with the protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. In United States v. Moran, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether investigatory stops based on reasonable suspicion of a completed misdemeanor are constitutionally permissible. The Tenth Circuit held that the investigatory stop based on the commission of a past misdemeanor was reasonable in light of the strong governmental interest of “solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice” and the continuing threat to public safety posed by the unique factual circumstances presented in the case. The court, however, declined to make a blanket endorsement of all investigatory stops based on past misdemeanors. . . .
When I was working as a lawyer in the Clinton administration, first in the Department of Justice (DOJ), and then as Deputy General Counsel in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), I was involved in the debate about the merits of what I call the federalization movement of the 1990s. I arrived to work in the administration just before the passage of the Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act of 1994, which included a plethora of new federal crimes and enhanced penalties for existing crimes. Among the additions were the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) and the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act. Earlier the Congress had enacted the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 and the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.
These expansions of federal jurisdiction into areas of criminal-law enforcement traditionally within the purview of the states spawned energetic criticism. Federal judges expressed concern that these legislative enactments expanded the reach of federal jurisdiction and that the resulting effects on federal court dockets would cause an erosion of the traditional mission of the federal courts. In their view, constitutional and policy considerations indicated the wisdom of a limited role for the federal courts in these areas, and continued expansion of the role of federal courts would threaten quality and competence. . . .
This Note argues that there should be more protection for tenants and buyers of converted SUV residential properties. Part II examines rental-housing conversion practices and provides a summary of federal, state, and local laws designed to protect individuals and the public from the adverse effects of conversion. Part III begins with a discussion of the current law’s failure to adequately protect the elderly, handicapped, and low-to-moderate income SUV tenants from conversion’s negative effects. Then, Part III argues that eliminating the SUV rental-housing exemptions, requiring developers to report condominium conversions to government agencies, and compiling conversion statistics will increase public awareness and enforcement of tenant protections.
Many jurisdictions apply a discovery rule with respect to statutes of limitations in tort law causes of action. These jurisdictions toll the statute until the plaintiff learned, or reasonably should have learned, that the defendant’s conduct caused harm. The Supreme Court has expressly declined to determine whether a discovery rule applies in Title VII claims. In Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff employee must bring suit against his employer within either 180 or 300 days of the intentional discriminatory act.
This Note addresses the problems in the Ledbetter decision. The first section discusses Title VII, the predominant statute under which plaintiffs may file employment discrimination actions. The following section reviews the policies underlying statutes of limitations and related equitable remedies. The Note then traces the development of employment discrimination law as interpreted by the Supreme Court prior to the 2007 Ledbetter decision. Next, it explores the majority and dissenting opinions of the Ledbetter decision. Finally, this Note will analyze the pending legislation proposed in the wake of this decision and recommend that Congress revise Title VII to include the discovery rule and address the effects such legislation would have on future employee plaintiffs and employer defendants. . . .
In late June 2007, the newly formed Roberts Supreme Court of the United States issued two significant opinions: Morse v. Frederick, and Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1. The Morse case involved a Juneau, Alaska, high-school student who was disciplined for unfurling the now-infamous “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner during a school-sponsored event. The Seattle School District case concerned school districts in Seattle and Louisville that were using racial classifications to make pupil assignments in certain schools. Both decisions were narrowly decided and seemed to mark a shift in the constitutional law governing student speech and school desegregation. . . .