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I can never get this straight: Is it “grow or die” or “grow and die”? In late 2008, the Heller Ehrman and Thelen firms failed. Heller Ehrman, founded in 1890, had 730 lawyers spread across fifteen offices in the U.S. and abroad. Thelen, dating from 1924, had more than 600 lawyers in offices on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and in Shanghai. In mid-February 2009, other large law firms terminated 1,100 lawyers and staffers in only two days. A week or two later, Latham and Watkins, which had 2,300 lawyers in twenty-eight offices, terminated 190 lawyers and 250 members of its staff. Over a six-month period in 2008, Cadwalader, Wickersham and Taft, a 206-year-old New York based firm, laid off 131 lawyers, 20% of the firm. Cadwalader and Latham are both aggressively managed firms that have been among the most profitable in recent years. . . .
In May of 2007, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly that literally revolutionized the standard for determining the legal sufficiency of a complaint. In that decision, which Justice Souter wrote for the majority, the Court abandoned the fifty-year-old “no set of facts” standard set out in Conley v. Gibson, and substituted a “plausibility” standard. Some two years later, in May of 2009, the Court handed down Ashcroft v. Iqbal, a case that provided the Court the opportunity of reaffirming and clarifying Twombly and in which the Court extended the Twombly standard to all civil cases filed in the federal district courts. Significantly, this time, in Iqbal, Justice Souter dissented. This article will examine the impact of these two decisions on the concept of notice pleading and on motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. . . .
This Note examines current factors affecting copyright rights, critiques the PRO-IP Act as a response to those factors, and explores recent business strategies for monetizing the production of intellectual property notwithstanding those factors. Part II.A examines the history of copyright law as responsive to technological, cultural, economic, and political changes in the intellectual property environment. Part II.B describes United States copyright law prior to the passage of the PRO-IP Act and examines the prior law’s efficacy within the current intellectual property environment. Part II.C explains how the PRO-IP Act amended the copyright statute. Part II.D examines recent effective business strategies to sustain profits. Part III critiques the PRO-IP Act from political, technological, cultural, and economic perspectives. Part III.A argues that, from a political standpoint, while the Act squarely addresses international infringement concerns, it deals with domestic infringement in a highly oppressive manner. Part III.B contends that Congress’s difficulty accepting technological development has forced an overemphasis on ensuring fairness to commercial information producers. Part III.C asserts that the Act is problematic from a cultural perspective because it fails to account for access to modern information production technology, inhibits the production of culturally valuable information, and views decentralized information production as an evil. Part III.D criticizes the economic reasoning behind the passage of the Act because it stems from an incomplete cost-benefit analysis and ignores the opportunity cost of stifling new business development. . .