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Symposium—Contract as Promise at 30: The Future of Contract Theory

Thirty years after its publication, Contract as Promise remains the canonical presentation of a liberal, autonomy-based conception of contractual obligation. In Charles Fried’s words, “The moral force behind contract as promise is autonomy: the parties are bound to their contract because they have chosen to be,” and their “rights and duties [are] as far as possible a function of their own will and not of standards of justice external to that will.”  While other strains of liberal contract theory (consent-based, obligation-based) may differ from Prof. Fried’s “will” theory of contracts in other respects, they all share his foundational commitment to the view that promissory obligations, unlike most other forms of obligation, are voluntarily assumed. The same is true of most liberal, autonomy-based conceptions of promissory obligation in the moral realm.  The question I wish to pursue here is this: Having established the voluntary nature of promissory obligation, has liberal contract theory (LCT) put itself out of a job? What further role, if any, does it have to play in elaborating the nature and content of promissory obligation? . . .