This Note argues that, absent objection at trial, the Massachusetts courts should review admission of objectionable evidence as potential ineffective assistance of counsel, rather than as error under the miscarriage of justice standard. Part II.A discusses the impact of the Melendez-Diaz decision on Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and posits that the Massachusetts courts will apply the miscarriage of justice standard to unpreserved claims of error based on Melendez-Diaz. Part II.B.1 begins a discussion of the evolution of appellate review in Massachusetts, describing the state’s traditional rule of finality. Part II.B.2 examines the emergence of review for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice and ineffective assistance of counsel as exceptions to the traditional rule. Part II.B.3 recounts the Massachusetts courts’ struggle to define the limits of miscarriage of justice review. Lastly, using appeals based on Melendez-Diaz as illustrative examples, Part III argues that the Massachusetts courts’ current approach is inconsistent with the traditional meaning of “miscarriage of justice,” misunderstands the distinction between the miscarriage of justice and ineffective assistance of counsel standards, and undermines the role of counsel in our legal system. . .
